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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
WILBUR MAWHINNEY and RUTH
E. MAWHINNEY,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,
-

Case No.
7537

vs.-

JOHN A. JENSEN and ANN A
JENSEN,
Defendants and Respondents.

Appellants' Brief
This is an appeal from the Order of the District
Court dismissing plaintiffs' case, which Order was based
upon the sustaining of a General Demurrer to the plaintiffs' amended complaint, wherein leave to further
amend plaintiffs' amended complaint was denied at the
time the demurrer was sustained.
The pertinent parts of plaintiffs' amended complaint are a.s follows:
1. (Allegations as to venue.)
1

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

2. That on the 14th day of September, 194.6, and
for many years prior thereto the defendants were the
owners and operators of the property known as the
Jensen Hotel, consisting of a restaurant, coffee shop,
fourteen cabins and a two-story hotel-apartment building situated in Heber City, County of Wasatch, State
of Utah; that the defendants thereby had had long
familiarty with such businesses; that at that time they
had complete and exclusive knowledge of all of the stock
therein and the costs thereof; that the plaintiffs were
newcomers to such businesses and were at said time
unfamiliar with the conduct of such business, the volume and rapi~ity of stock turnover, the nature and
quantity of the stock therein and the cost thereof.
3. That on or about the 14th day of September, 1946,
the defendants above named made and entered into a
written earnest money contract for the purchase of
that certain restaurant and hotel business with these
plaintiffs, as follows:
Salt Lake City, Utah, Sept. 14th, 1946
EARNEST MONEY RECEIPT AND AGREEMENT
RECEIVED FROM W. H. Mawhinney the sum of
One Thousand Dollars to secure and apply on the purchase of the following described property known as the
Jensen Hotel, Restaurant, Coffee Shop, 14 cabins, and
the 2 story apartment house, situated in Heber City,
Utah.
For the purchase price of Thirty Five Thousand
Dollars.
2
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The balance of the purchase- price shall be paid as
follows : Nine Thousand Cash. Balance $200.00 per
month plus interest on the unpaid balance.
Interest at 4% per annum on the unpaid portions
of the purchase price to be included in the prescribed
payments and possession given Nov. 1st, 1946.
Property taxes for the current yea.r shall be adjusted on pro-rata calendar basis, seller to pay for
period from January 1st to date of closing, purchaser
from date of closing to December 31st. Rents, insurance, interest, water and other expenses of said property shall be pro-rated as of date of closing. No exceptions.
Contr~ct of sale or instrument of conveyance to be
made on- the approv-ed form of the Salt Lake Real
Estate Board in the narne of W. H. Mawhinney and
Ruth E(" Mawhinney.*

The following items are included in the purchase
price and are to remain with the property. All stock
and fixtures no'v on property.
This payment is made subject to the approval of
the Seller and unless so approved within 2 days from
date hereof, the return of the money herein receipted
shall cancel this sale without damage to the undersigned.

In the event the prurchaser shall fail to pay the
balance of said purchase price or complete sarid purchase as herein provided, the amounts paid hereon
shall, at the option of the Seller, be retained as liquidated and agreed damages.*
It is understood and agreed that the terms written
in this receipt constitute the entire Preliminary Contract between the Buyer and Seller and that no verbal
statements made by a representative of the Agent relative to this transaction shall be construed to be a part
of this transaction unless incorporated in writing herein.
3

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

It is further agreed that the execution of final transfer
papers -abrogate this Earnest Money Receipt.
The Seller agrees in consideration of the efforts of
the agent in procuring a purchaser to pay said agent
the rate of commission as established by the Salt Lake
Real Estate Board.
Brockbank Realty Co.
(s) L. B. Pearson, Agent
We do hereby agree to carry out and fulfill the
terms and conditions on the above receipt specified, the
seller agreeing to furnish a good marketable title wit;h
abstract to date, or policy of title insurance at the option
of the seller and to make final conveyance by sufficient
deed. If either party fails so to do, he agrees to pay
the expenses of enforcing this agreement, including a
reasonable attorney's fee.
/s/ J. A. Jensen
/s/ Anna Jensen

/s/ W. H. Mawhinney
/s/ Ruth E. Mawhinney

Together with all stock and fixtures now on the
above described premises.
*Italics ours.
4. That at the time of making said agreement,
and as an inducement to the plaintiffs to enter into
said agreement for the purchase price stated therein, the
plaintiffs examined the stock, merchandise, fixtures,
premises and other items and accessories on said premises in the company of the defendant, John A. Jensen and
the defendants' agent L. B. Pearson and was informed
by the defendant John A. Jensen, that all the said items
were included in the aforesaid contract and were to be
conveyed by said contract.
4
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5. That at the time of making said agreement it
was agreed that on the 1st day of November, 1946, the
defendants would relinquish possession of the said prentises and iten1s of personal property to the plaintiffs
and at or before that time a uniform real estate contract
would be executed by the parties in furtherance of the
agreement reached by the parties at the time of the
execution of the aforesaid earnest money agreement.
That the parties agreed that the defendants might use
from the stock on s-ai4 premises during the period between September 14th, 1946 and the time of the relinquishment of possession to the plaintiffs, but that the
defendants would replace all the stock or any other
items on the said premises which they might use.
6. That on or about the 17th day of September,
1946, and again on or about the 23rd day of September,
1946, the plaintiff Wilbur Mawhinney went to the premises in question by app.ointment with defendant John
A. Jensen for the purpose of inventorying the said
premises; that on each of these occasions he requested
the defendant John A. Jensen to permit him, the plaintiff Wilbur Mav.rhinney, to make a written inventory
of all the items of personal property and fixtures which
were the subject of the above-mentioned contract bet\veen these parties; that on each of the said occasions,
the defendant John A. Jensen informed the plaintiff
Wilbur l\fawhinney that he was too busy and did not
have the time to conduct an inventory with him on
that date; that he would not allo"v Wilbur Mawhinney
to take it except with him; that in consequence hereof,
the plaintiffs were never able to obtain a full, accurate
5
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inventory of the personal property and fixtures which
were to have passed by virtue of the said agreement.
7. That on or about the 23rd day of September,
1946, while plaintiff Wilbur Mawhinney was waiting
on the premises in question to conduct the inventory with
the defendants, he was able to list portions of the personal property on said premises, but was not able to·
list those items of stock and other personal property
which are described in Paragraph 10 below, because
he was denied access by the defendant John A. Jensen
to the places where these items were stored.
8. That on the 28th day of October, 1946, the plaintiffs and the defendants assembled for the execution
of their uniform real estate contract in the lobby of the
hotel premises, the subject of the said contract; and at
this time the plaintiff Wilbur Mawhinney demanded
of defendant John A. Jensen that the said defendant
then and there permit him to inspect the premises and
inventory the balance of the stock in order that he
might knovv, before executing the real estate contract,
that all of the stock which was on hand at the time
of the execution of the earnest money agreement was
still there or had been replaced.
9. That at this time, the defendant John A. Jensen
refused to permit the plaintiffs to enter upon his premises for the purpose of making such inventory; that he
refused to go with them to make such inventory; that
he indicated that he was greatly offended and insulted
that the plaintiffs should question his word or feel
6
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that an inventory 'vas necessary at this time; and that he
informed the plaintiffs that all of the stock which was
on the pre1uises at the time of the execution of the
earnest money agreement ""'as still there or had been
replaced, so that the quantities were the same at this
time as they had been at time of the execution of the
earnest n1oney agreement; that at said time the plaintiffs 'vere bound by s·a.id earnest money agreement to
execute the uniform real estate contract and would have
been in default thereunder if they had refused to execute san1e; that at said time and at s•a.id previous times
referred to in Paragraphs 6, 7, and 8 herein, plaintiffs
were prevented by the tricks and artifices of the defendant John A. Jensen from obtaining a true inventory
of stock on said premises; that the plaintiffs thereupon
signed the uniform real estate contract, the pertinent
parts of which are as follows :
UNIFORM REAL ESTATE CONTRACT
THIS AGREEMENT, made in duplicate this
28th day of October, A. D. 1946, by and between
John A. Jensen, also known as J. A. Jensen and
Anna Jensen, his wife, hereinafter designated as
the Seller, and W. H. Mawhinney and Ruth E.
Mawhinney, his wife, as joint tenants, not as
tenants in common with full rights of survivorship hereinafter designated as the Buyer, of
Heber City, Utah.
WITNESSETH: That the Seller, for the
consideration herein mentioned agrees to sell
and convey to the buyer, and the buyer for the
consideration herein mentioned agrees to purchase the following described real property, towit:

7
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See attached sheet for legal description (A
legal description of the premises sold was
contained on an attached sheet).
Together with all improvements, fixtures,
equipment, signs, merchandise and stock now on
the premises; see attached Itemized List. (This
inventory listed certain fixtures and hotel and
tourist cabin equipment, but included no items of
stock; i.e., food, /used in a resta~trant business.)
Together with all rights and interest in and
to the lease dated December 28, 1937, by and between Melvin D. Close and Hope Close, his wife,
the parties of the first part and Jack A. Jensen
and Anna Jensen, his wife, parties of the second
part, including the 2 story, 3 apartments Green
Building located on property involved in this
lease with all furnishings and improvements included.
Said buyer hereby agrees to enter into possession and pay for said described premises the
sum of Thirty Five Thousand ($35,000.00) dollars, payable at office of Sellers or assigns in
Heber City, Utah, strictly within the following
times, to-wit: Ten Thousand ($10,000.00) dollars
cash, the receipt of which is hereby acknowledged.
Balance to be paid $200.00 December 1, 1946 and
$200.00 or more on the first day of each month
thereafter until this contract, with interest, is
paid in full.
Said monthly payments to be applied first to
the payment of interest and second to the reduction of the principal. Interest shall be charged
from November 1, 1946 on all unpaid portions of
the purchase price at the rate of 4 per cent per
annum, payable monthly. Buyer agrees to maintain a merchandise inventory of Three Thousand
8
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Five Hundred Dollars ($3,500.00) at all times
during the life of this contract.

* * * * *
In the event of a failure to comply with the
terms hereof by the buyer, or up.on failure to
make any payments when the same shall become
due, or within 30 days thereafter, the Seller shall,
at his option, be released from all obligations in
law and equity to convey said property and all
pay1nents which have been made theretofore on
this contract by the Buyer, shall be forfeited to
the Seller as liquidated·damages for the non-performance of the contract, and the Buyer agrees
that the Seller may, at his option, re-enter and
take possession of said premises without legal
process a.s in its first and former estate, together
with all improvements and additions made by the
Buyer thereon, and the said additions and improvem-ents shall remain with the land and become the property of the Seller, the Buyer becoming at once a tenant at will of the Seller. It
is agreed that time is the essence of this agreement.
* *
* *
>j(;

The Seller on receiving the payments herein
reserved to be paid at the times and in the
manner above mentioned agrees to execute and
deliver to the Buyer or assigns, a good and sufficient warranty deed conveying the title to the
above described p·remises free and clear of all
encumbrances except as herein mentioned and
except as may have accrued by or through the
acts or neglect of the Buyer, and to furnish at
his expense, an abstract or a policy of title insurance, at the option of the Seller, brought to
date at time of sale or at time of delivery of deed
at the option of Buyer.
9
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It is hereby expressly understood and agreed
by the parties hereto that the Buyer accepts the
said property in its· present condition and that
there are no representations, covenants, or agreements between the parties hereto with reference
to said proprty except as herein specifically set
forth or attached hereto.
Abstracts to date.
* * :)(; * *
(Signatures of all parties.)
10. That the aforesaid representation of the defendant John A. Jensen was entirely false in this: That he,
the said John A. Jensen, had removed therefrom large
quantities of stock, merchandise, fixtures and equipment. That the following is a list of the equipment which
the said defendant had removed from said premises
and which equipment had been on the premises at the
time of the execution of the earnest money agreement;
that opposite each item listed below is stated the value
of said personalty at the time the parties entered into
the earnest money agreement: (The complaint then contained three pages of i terns of stock, merchandise, equipment and fixtures used in the operation of a restaurant
and hotel business, including large quantities of food
and condiments.)
11. That because of the representation of the defendant John A. Jensen as aforesaid, and because the plaintiffs were prevented by the tricks and artifices of the
said defendants from obtaining a true and correct inventory of the premises, and because the plaintiffs were
bound by the earnest money agree1nent previously re10
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ferred to to execute said unifortn real estate contract
at that tiine, plaintiffs were induced to believe, and did
believe, that all of the said personal property which had
been on the premises at the tin1e of execution of the
earnest money agreement \vas still there and that they
\Vere thereby induced to enter into said uniform real
estate contract as it was then worded.
~2.

That the defendants, and both of them, W·ell
knew that the statement of the defendant John A. Jensen
to the effect that the quantity of the stock was then the
same as it had been at the time of the execution of the
earnest money agreement was entirely false and fraudu.,.
lent; that the defendants and both of them, well knew that
the said plaintiffs were wholly dependent .upon what the
defendant John A. Jensen said in reference to the quantity of stock and merchandise on the premises, because
the defendants, and not the plaintiffs, were familiar
with the· conduct and stock and merchandise of said
business and because the defendants tricks ·and ~a.rtifices
previously referred to in Paragraphs 6, 7 and 8 had prevented the plaintiffs from obtaining a true and correct
inventory of said premises.
13. That the aforesaid false and fraudulent staternent \Vas made \vith the intent and purpose of the defendants to deceive the plaintiffs and to induce the plaintiffs to buy said business aforementioned by misleading
them into executing the said uniform real estate contract as it was then worded, the defendants well kno"\ving that the plaintiffs were \Yholly relying upon said
rPpresen ta tion.
11
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14. That the plaintiffs, and both of them, were entirely ignorant of the falsity of the statement of the defendant John A. Jensen.
15. That because the plaintiffs were prevented by
the tricks and artifices previously referred to from making an inventory, and because the plaintiffs were bound
by said earnest money agreement as aforesaid, they were
induced .by the misrepresentations of the defendant John
A. Jensen, to believe that the stock was the same and to
execute the said real estate contract as it was then worded; that the plaintiffs wholly relied upon said representation and believed the same to be true; that they
'vould not have entered into the said uniform real estate
contract as it was then worded had they known that the
vast quantities of stock mentioned above in Paragraph
10 had been removed therefrom.
16. That the plaintiffs had no reason to know that
the defendant John A. Jensen did lie to them; that they
were strangers to the community, having lived out of the
county prior to the time of the execution of the earne8t
money contract; that they were assured by the defendants' attorney, L. C. Montgomery, an attorney l~censed
to practice law in the State of Utah and practicing in
Heber City, County of Wasatch, State of Utah, that,
"John is an honest man", that, "John would keep the
stock up", and that "I've known him for years"; that
because of these facts and the facts set forth in Paragraphs 11, 12, 13 and 15 the plaintiffs 'vere induced to
rely upon the false representation of the defendants
that the stock was the same.

12
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17. That upon entering into possession of the prenlises after the execution of the uniform real estate contract, the plaintiffs found that the vast quantities of
personal property outlined in Paragraph 10 above had
been removed therefron1 to the damage of the plaintiffs
in the amount of $10,766.00.
18. That in the purchase money contract, it was
stated that the plaintiffs were to receive all stock and
fixtures now on the above described premises, and that
the said John A. Jensen stated that this included all of
the items of personal property of every sort and nature
then on the premises; and that this was the basis of
agreement of the parties when they entered into the
earnest money agreement; that because of the fraud of
the defendants, the uniform real estate contract states
that the plaintiffs were to receive "·all improvements,
fixtures, equipment, signs, merchandise -and stock now
on the premises. See attached itemized list.''
19. That whereas this purported to be the same contract as the original earnest money agreement, and it was
intended by the plaintiffs that this contract should be
to the same effect as the earnest money agreement, it
was in effect entirely different from the earnest money
agreement because of the removal of the vast quantities of personal property as set out hereinabove.

20. That the itemized list attached to the real estate
contract vvas not intended by the parties to include all
of the itern~ transferred by s-aid contract, because plaintiffs had been prevented from completing said inventory

13
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by d_efendants, and they, the. defendants, well knew the
said list was not complete, and it was attached only because of the representation of the defendant John A.
Jensen that the status of the stock was the same then
as it haa been at the time of the earnest money agreement.

21. That in order that the uniform real estate contract might have the same connotation as the earnest
money agreem-ent in furtherance of whieh it was executed,
it should have stated as follows: ''Together with all improvements, fixtures, equipment, signs, merchandise and
stock on the pre1nises on the 14th day of September,
1946."
22 .. That the defendants have breached said contract, reformed as asked in that they have failed, neglected and refused to transfer, replace or convey to the
plaintiffs the property set forth in Paragraph 10.
*
* * *
For a second alternative count to plaintiffs' first
cause of action against the defendants, the plaintiffs
allege as follows :
:)!:

1. Refer to and repeat Paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, (),
7 and 8 of plaintiffs' first count.
2. That at this time the defendant John A. Jensen
refused to permit the plaintiffs to enter upon the premises for the purpose of 1naking such inventory; that he
refused to go with then1 to make such inventory, and that
he then and there falsely, fraudulently and deceitfully

14
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represented and asserted to the plaintiffs that all of the
stock which was on the premises at the time of the execution of the earnest money agreement was still there,
or had been replaced so that the quantities were the
same at this tin1e as they had been at the time of the execution of the earnest money agreement; that at. said
time the plaintiffs \vere bound by said earnest money
agreement, previously referred to, to sign the real es;..
tate con tract ; and that at said time and said times previously referred to in Paragraph 6, 7 and 8 of plaintiffs' first count, plaintiffs were prevented by the tricks
and ·artifices of the defendant John A. Jensen from obtaining a true inventory of the stock on said premises;
that the plaintiffs thereupon signed the. uniform real
estat.e contract.
3. Refers to and repeats Paragraph 10 o£ plaintiffs' first count.
4. That the plaintiffs would not have entered inio
said real estate contract as it was worded had they known
that the vast quantities of stock listed in Paragraph 10
had been removed therefrom.
5. Refers to and repeats P:aragra ph 11 of plaintiffs'
first conn t.
6. Refers to and repeats Paragraph 12 of plaintiffs' first count.
7. That the aforesaid false and fraudulent statement was made with the intent and purpose of the defendants to deceive the plaintiffs and to induce the plain-

15
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tiffs to buy said premises by misleading them into executing the said uniform real estate contract as it was
then worded, the defendants well knowing that the plaintiffs were wholly relying upon said representation, and
the defendants contemplating and intending that the
plaintiffs would sign the said uniform real estate contract as it was then worded in reliance upon said representation.
8. Refers to and repeats Paragraphs 14 and 15 of
plaintiffs' first count.
9. That the plaintiffs had no reason to know that
the defendant John A. Jensen did lie to them; that they
were strangers to the community, having lived out of the
community prior to the time of the execution of the purchase money contract; that they were assured by the
defendants' attorney, L. C. Montgomery, an attorney
licensed to practice law in the State of Utah and practicing law in Heber City, County of Wasatch, State of
Utah, that, "John is an honest man", that "John would
keep the stock up", and that "I've known him for
years"; that because of these facts and the f,acts set
forth in Paragraph 2 of plaintiffs' first count ·and Paragraphs 5, 6, 7 and 9 of this count the plaintiffs were entitled to rely, and had a right to rely upon the false representation set forth in Paragraph 2 of this count above.
10. Refers to and repeats Paragraphs 17, 18, 19
and 20 of plaintiffs' first count.
11. That as -a natural and probable consequence of
the misrepresentations of the defendants as set forth

16
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herein in Paragraph 2 above, the plaintiffs executed
said uniform real estate contract and were damaged in
the ·amount of $10,7.66.00.
As a third alternative count, plaintiffs allege as
follows:
1. Refer to and repeat Paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5
of the plaintiffs' first count.
2. That on the 28th day of October, 1946, the plaintiffs and defendants assembled for the execution of the
uniform real estate contract in the lobby of t he hotel
pr~mises, subject of said contract; that at said time the
defendant John A. Jensen represented and warranted
to the plaintiffs that all of the stock that w.a.s on the
premises at the time of the execution of the earnest
money agreement was still there or had been replaced so
that the quantities were the same at that time as they
had been at the time of the execution of the earnest
money agreement and thereby induced the plaintiffs to
purchase the said premises by signing the said uniform.
real estate con tract.
3. That the defendants breached the aforesaid representations and warranty in this: That upon entering
into possession of the premises after the execution of the
uniform real estate contract, the plaintiffs found that
a vast quantity of personal property outlined in Paragraph 10 of plaintiffs' first count had been ,removed
therefrom, whereby plaintiffs were damaged in the sum
of $10,766.00.

17
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WHEREFORE, plaintiffs pray as follows:
1. That said uniform real ·estate contract be reformed so as to state: ''Together with all improvements,
fixtures, eq~ipment, signs, merchandise and stock on the
premises on the 14th day of September, 1946" so as to
conform to the expressed intent of the parties as aforesaid.
2. For the sum of $10,766.00, with intere'St thereon
at the rate of 6% per annum from the 1st day of November, 1946.
3. For their costs herein, a reasonable attorney
fee and for such other and further relief as the court
may deem just and equitable.

POINTS RELIED UPON FOR RE\TERSAL
1. The first count in a.ppllants' complaint states a
cause of action for reformation of the "Uniform Real
Estate Contract'' and for damages for breach thereof
as reformed.
2. Appellants' second count states a cause of action
in deceit against respondents.
3. Appellants' third count states a cause of action
for breach of warranty against respondents.

18
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

ARGUMENT
1.
This first count in appellants' complaint states a
cause of.: action for reformation of the "Uniform Real
Estate Contract'' and for damages for breach thereof
as reformed.
The basis for the equitable relief of reformation is
set out in 45 Am. Jur~ "Reformation of Instruments",
Section 7, Page 586. I quote :
"Inasmuch as the relief. sought in reforming
instrument is. 'to make it conform to
the real agreement or intention of the parties, a
definite intention or agreement on which the
minds of the parties had met* must have preexisted the instrument in question ... The prior
agreement or intention must, of course, differ
.from the instrument in question or there would
be no ground for relief ... and it must be further
shown that the difference was due to fraud or
mistake. If no prior agreement or intention
existed, then the only remedy is rescission.''

a written

·*Italics ours.
Numerous Utah cases have dealt 'vith situations
warranting reformation or rescission, and these opinions clearly indicate that reformation of a writing which
was executed to record a prior oral agreement or to
complete the details of a prior written agreement will
be allowed if the requisite facts for relief from fraud
or mistake are present. Reforn1ation was granted in
Nordfors vs. Knight et ux., 60 P. 2d 115, Cram et al vs.
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Reynolds et oal., 55 Utah 384, 186 Plac. 100, and in Garnet
vs. Thomas et al., 75 P. 2d 168.
Instruments are rescinded rather than reformed
where there has been no prior intention to be implemented by writing in question, though the other elements of
a reformation case are pre'Sent. This was done in Adamson et ux. vs. Brockbank et al., 185 P. 2d 264, Stuck et al
vs. Delta Land and Water Company, 63 Utah 490, 277 P.
791, and in Bennett et al. vs. Bowen et al., 65 Utah 444,
238 P. 240.
Clearly this rule applies to the case at hand. The
first agreement-the so-called ''Earnest Money Agreement" (Paragraph 3 of Amended Complaint, Supra
P. 2) stated all of the principal terms of the contract
and further indicated that a subsequent contract would
be made ''on the approved form of the Salt Lake Real
Estate Board". It was obviously intended that the second contract would be entirely consistent with the "Earnest Money Agreement".
The allegations show that the second contract (Para·
graph 9 of the amended complaint, Supra P. 16) was in
terms entirely consistent with the first contract except
for the inconsistency induced by the fraud. They further
show that the parties never manifested any intention·
of altering the terms of the first agreement in the second
agreement.
Of course, the flaw sought to be eliminated by reformation must have been caused by actionable fraud
20
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or mutual mistake. We are concerned here with fraud.
The requirements for actionable fraud in Utah for cases
· seeking reformation, rescission, or in tort based on deceit, are set forth in Stuck et al. vs. Delta Land and
Water Company, 63 Utah 490; 227 Pac. 791 as follows:
(at Page 505.)
''It may be stated generally that the elements
of actual fraud consist of: (1) A representation;
(2) its falsity; (3) its materiality; (4) the
speaker's knowledge of its falsity or ignorance
of its truth; ( 5) his intent that it should be acted
upon by the person and in the ma~ner reasonably
contemplated; (6) the hearer's ignorance of its
falsity; (7) his reliance upon its truth; (8) his
right to rely thereon; (9) his consequent and
proximate injury.''
,

The main contention of respondents in their argument to· the trial judge was that appellants had no right
to rely on the representations of the respondents, thatthey were negligent to do so and were, therefore, not
entitled to relief. We submit that little question can be
raised as to the sufficiency of the allegations to meet
the other eight requirements outlined above.
Respondents cited the case of Rushton vs. Hallett,
8 Utah 277, as sustaining their point. In this case plaintiffs agreed to sell to defendants two certain tracts of
land between which was a third tract of land which had
at one time been purportedly conveyed to the City, but,
as claimed by plaintiffs, such conveyance had never been
completed. The defendants prepared first a deed describing the two outside pieces of land. A short while
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later, they prepared a second deed which they presented
to the plaintiffs and represented to be the same as the
first. However, its description covered the three tracts,
including the center lot. It also included this exception :
''But there is nevertheless excepted from the foregoing
the street heretofore deeded to s!a.id city, and embraced in
said last mentioned lot 1, section 11, township 1 aforesaid.'' Plaintiffs allege that defendants fraudulently misrepresented to the1n that the second deed was the same
as the first.
The court denied reformation, stating two bases:
I quote from Page 283 :
'' ... If the ground can be identified, the title
does not pass to the defendants, and, if no street
existed at all, the title to the disputed· ground
still remains in the plaintiffs, and they have no
cause for complaint against the defendants .. The
question as to who owns the land is between them
and the city ... The plaintiffs were in possession;
still are in possession, knew all about how it lay,
and its boundaries. The parties were at arm's
length. No relation of confidence or trust existed
between them; and, if the plaintiffs were imposed
upon, it was their own neglect.''
Since the circumstances in the Rushton case and this
case as to knowledge, access to information, etc., are dissimilar, it could not be said to be controlling. The numerous other Utah cases more clearly spell out the limitations of the "right to rely" doctrine. We contend that
they reveal these considerations: (1) That negligence
will not bar relief in fraud cases nearly so readily as in
mutual 1nistake cases, and (2) that in fraud cases only
22
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the most extre1ne negligence will bar the defrauded party
fro1n relief.
In Garner v. Thomas et al., 75 P. 2d 168 and in Nordfors YS. Knight et ux., 60 P. 2d 1115, relief was granted
based on mutual mistake. In the Garner case the injured
party had failed to read a deed she signed. In the Nordfors case, the plaintiff had failed to have a survey made.
rrhese cases indicate how little consideration has been
given the ''negligence'' doctrine in the absence of circutnstances of estoppel, rights of third parties or laches.
The only cases denying reformation on ground of
negligence which counsel for appellant has been able to
find are George vs. Fritsch Loan and Trust Company,
·69 Utah 460, · 256 Pac. 400, and Federal Land B·ank of
Berkely vs. Salt Lake Valley Sand and Gravel Company
et al., 89 P. 2d 791. In the George case the injured party
drew the. document and acquiesced in it while .the other
party spent a large sum in reliance upon it. In the Federal Land Bank case the evidence failed on the question of
mistake.
Even Judge Wolfe's dictum in the case of Garner
vs. Thomas et al. (on petition for rehearing) 78 P. 2d
529, merely states that the pleading must contain "an
allegation that the (injured party) . . . . .had not been
guilty of negligence in signing the mortgage," which requirement '"·e submit \Ve have met, and furthermore
he \vas discussing a mutual mistake situation.
Numerous Utah cases dealing with fraud situations
have gran ted relief. In Crain et ·al vs. Reynolds et ·al.,
23
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55 Utah 384, 186 P. 100, the parties had agreed to execute
a contract and deed transferring certain land, including
11 shares of water. (These were shares in an incorporated water company). When they got together and had
the papers drawn up, the defendant noticed that the
water shares were not mentioned in the contract or the
deed. He then asked his attorney if they went with the
land and- was informed that they did not, but that he
should transfer them. He stated then that he would let
them sweat a little while. When later on in the evening
the water shares were demanded by the plaintiffs, he
stated that he had signed enough papers and would
sign no more that day. Thereafter, the action was prosecuted for the reformation of the contract and deed to include the water shares.
Reform·ation was granted, the Court stating as follows: (At Page 386)
"~utual

mistakes can be corrected, and courts
will reform a contract so as to express what the
parties actually agreed upon and make it express
the terms upon which the minds of both parties
met. The law on the subject is well established
in this jurisdiction.''
(It should be noted that in this case we have on one
side a mistake which might have easily been said to be
due to the parties' negligence, but on the other hand, the
knowledge of that Inistake by the other party which he
fraudulently 'vithheld from the persons who would suffer from it.)
24
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In Stuck et al. vs. Delta Land and Water Company,
63 Utah 490, 227 P. 791, plaintiffs after seeing certain
circulars distributed by defendant in California, came
to Utah to vie'v certain lands for which defendant was
seeking settlers to whon1 defendant comp,a.ny proposed
to sell certain rights. In its circular the com.pany represented that the Pahvant Valley (the lands for which defendant "-as seeking settlers) was a thoroughly proven
general farming district. Defendant's agents took the
plaintiffs to certain of the cultiv~ated lands which were
farmed in Pahvant Valley and introduced them to many
of the farmers, all of whom spoke in a laudatory manner
concerning the property. Then the agents conducted
the plaintiffs to a tract of unoccupied land in the northern part of the district where there 'vere two pieces of
land open for entry.
While plaintiffs examined the unoccupied lands, they
discovered in some places thereon a white substance
'vhich they t·hought was alkali. When they asked defendant's agents about this, they were assured that it was
not ~alkali but gypsum and was not injurious to the land,
and that the soil had been duly tested. Relying thereon the plaintiffs entered upon the land, paid the ap.p·ropriate fee to the State and purchased, for a considerable
sum, the necessary water rights. Their crops, however,
turned out to be an almost total failure because of excessive quantities of alkali on the land.
The trial court awarded damages on the basis of the
allegations and proof, and the Supreme Court affirmed
·the judgment, sta.ting as follows: (At Page 506)
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''Appellant also quotes the following excerpt
from Black on Rescission and Cancellation, -Paragraph 113:
'It is a rule of great antiquity, and supported by a great body of authorities that a
person about to enter into a contract or assume
an obligation should exercise reasonable care
and prudence in the matter of accepting at their
face value representations concerning the subject matter made to him by the opposite party;
and, although the representation were false and
fraudulent, and he was deceived by them and
misled to his injury, yet he cannot rescind or
repudiate his con tract on that ground, if it appears that he might have discovered their
falsity by mere inspection of the subject, or by
the exercise of reasonable diligence in referring to sources of information which were
equally open to him as to the other party.
There are exceptions to this rule . . . where
t,he matter was exclusively within the knowledge of one of them, where an examination of
the subject-matter would require unusual pains,
expense, or trouble, and involve special training or technical knowledge, w.nd so on.' ' =!('
And at Page 512:
. . . ''As far as the question of alkali is concerned, plaintiffs testified they were unfamiliar
with alkali, especially on desert land. Whether
or not a given substance is alkali can only be determined by experience or technical knowledge.
Plaintiffs testified that when they inquired of
these selling agents as to whether a certain substance seen upon the land they afterwards entered was alkali, the agents informed the1n it was
not alkali but gypsun1 and was not deleterious
to the land. They also informed plaintiffs that
26
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every 40 acres of the land had been tested and
that there was no alkali. These statements, together with the fact that it involved a question
of technical knowledge, undoubtedly brought the
question within the doctrine of the authorities
cited, especially Black on Rescission, Paragraph
113,* supra. Nor does the fact tha,t plaintiffs
themselves made some investigation of the project
arid went on the land alter the rule. ''
*Italics ours.
In Bennett et al. vs. Bowen et al., 65 Utah 444, 238
P. 240, the defendants had attended a certain Chautauqua
lecture in Logan, Utah, and as they were leaving the
hall, they were confronted by Plaintiff, W. G. Ruckenbrod, who had in hand a piece of folded paper, the
exposed side of which was blank. He asked each of them
if they enjoyed the lectures and if they wanted them
to return and requested the defendants to sign their
names to the blank paper, and represented to them
that it was for the purpose of ascertaining their interest
in and good will for the Chautauqua organization and
a desire that the association should return to Logan for
the season of 1923, the following year. Actually the
paper on the other side contained a written guaranty
contract. The defendant signed the paper in reliance
upon the statements and did not intend to enter into
any such con tract.
From a judgment for the plaintiff, the defendants
appealed. The Supreme Court, speaking through Justice
Thurman, reversed the trial court and held that the
defendants were not liable on their contract. Plaintiff
contended that the defendants were negligent in signing
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the contract and quoted from Greenfield's Estate, 14
Penn., Page 489, the following:''If a party who can read . . . will not read a
deed put before him for execution, or if, being
unable to read, will not demand to have it read or
explained to him, he is guilty of supine negligence, which, I take it, is not the subject of protection, either in equity or at law."
In dealing with the doctrine advanced in this case,
the Supreme Court stated as follows: (At Page 453)
''There may be some foundation for that doctrine, in the absence of fraud, misrepresentation
or concealment; but where one or more of these
occur it is not the law. Approximately 6,000 years
ago, when Cain's hands were reeking with the
blood of his brother Abel, he was asked the question, 'Where is Abel, thy brother~' Cain answered,
'I know not; am I my brother's keeper~' Human
nature has not changed. The idea is still prevalent that our brother must look out for himself.
It will not always do, however, in the administration of justice. We are our brother's keeper
to the extent that, if, in a business transaction,
we mislead him by fals·e representations or concealment, to his injury, we are liable for the consequences of our wrongful conduct. In Page on
Contracts (2d Ed.) Paragraph 233, it is said:
'If the party defrauded could read, has a
chance to read, and omits to read the instrument, relying on the adversary party's statement of its contents, the instrument should on
principle be treated as void, as between the
parties thereto, since it should be no defense
for the· party who is guilty of the fraud to say
that the other party was negligent in believing
him. The majority of the courts take this view
28
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of such cases, and hold such contract void, in
spite of the negligence of the defrauded
party.' ''

In The Beaver Drug Company vs. Hatch, 61 Utah
597, 217 P. 695, the defendant sold to plaintiff corporation a certain drug store business, including stock, for
an agreed sum. During the negotiations for the purchase of the property, the defendant, who for ten years
prior to the purchase was the owner and sole manager
of the business, represented to the plaintiff's incorporators that an inventory of the stock, merchandise and
drugs would total at least $4,000.00. In reliance upon
these representations, which the defendant knew were
untrue, the plaintiff corporation purchased the drug
store. Thereafter, an inventory of the stock was performed which indicated that it was worth only $2,834.59.
In this action plaintiff sought to recover the difference
between the inventory value and the represented value;
i.e. $1,166.41. The District Court awarded a judgment
for this sum to the plaintiff and the Supreme Court
sustained this award.
In Adamson, et ux. vs. Brockbank et al., 185 P.
2d 264, a common grantor of a large tract of ground
sold ten acres from the western and lower portion of
the tr.a.ct to the plaintiff for farming purposes. For
many years there had been an irrigation ditch running
the length of the eastern portion of the tract, and this
ditch was essential to the irrigation of the ten· acres
purchased by the plaintiff. Later on the grantor sold
to the defendants the eastern and higher portion of
the land. Thereafter the defendants erected a considerSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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able number of dwelling houses (which they called
Columbia Village), and in the process of this, they
destroyed the irrigation ditch.
After the defendants had purchased their portion
of the land, but before they destroyed the ditch, the
title insurance company discovered a discrepancy in
the boundary line between the defendants' and the plaintiff's property. Upon discovering this, Defendant Allen
Brockbank prepared a quitclaim deed and inportuned
the .plaintiffs to sign it. They at first refused to sign
the deed, but subsequently, after a number of visits
by Defendant Allen Brockbank :and after he had repeatedly informed plaintiffs that the sole purpose of
the deed was to clear up the discrepancy in the boundary,
plaintiffs executed the deed. No discussion had been had
with respect to their relinquishing their rights to the
use of the ditch.
Thereafter plaintiff sued defendants for damages
for the destruction of the ditch and also asked that
the quitclaim deed insofor as it purported to eras~
plaintiff's right in the ditch running across defendants'
land be rescinded. Defendants, of course, claimed that
the quitclaim deed had not only corrected the boundary
but had also erased plaintiff's easement.
The Supreme Court, speaking through Justice
Latimer, upheld the trial court in rescinding the quitclaim deed. To indicate the standard of care required
to entitle plaintiffs to rely upon defendants' representations as to the effect of the deed and Defendant Brock30
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bank's intention in obtaining it, the Court (at page
276) quoted from Black, ''Rescission of Contracts,''
Paragraph 68, Page 172, as follo,vs:
''The circumstances must have been such as
to justify the defrauded party in relying on the
representation, as a basis of his own decision or
action, without making an independent investi~
gation of its truth or falsity, or he must have
been in some way dissuaded or prevented from
making a sufficient investigation. . ''*
In applying this doctrine to the case at hand, the
Court stated: (also at Page 276}
''In considering the last of the principles
above quoted, it is sufficient to state that appellant Brockbank, by virtue of his superior knowledge; by his action of taking respondents to the
courthouse and pointing out the plats which revealed the existing discrepancy; by assuring respondents he would satisfy their mortgagee that
the quitclaim deed was only for the purpose of
clearing up the discrepancy; by obtaining clearances from the mortgagee of respondents' property; and by having a representa~tive of the title
insurance company further assure them of the
necessity and purpose of the deed; all these were
such circumstances as justified respondents in
relying on Brockbank's represent~ations without
making an independent investigation.''
*Italics ours.
These cases might warrant denial of relief where
a party simply fails to read a deed. But consider the
following circumstances alleged in the amended complaint which placed appellants in a most disadvantaSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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geous position in relation to respondents as far as
information, or opportunity to obtain it, were concerned:
a. Appellants were newcomers to the community
:and to this business and were unf.amiliar with the
volume of stock turnover or the quantity of stock
(Paragraph 2).
b. Since they were not given a right to inspect
the premices in the Earnest Money Agreement, if
they had refused to execute the second agreement
unless permitted to inventory, they would have forfeited their down payment and their rights under the
contract (Paragraph 3).
c. When Appellant Wilbur Mawhinney went on-

to the premises to inventory the stock, etc., he was
stalled by Respondent John A. Jensen, who said
he was too busy (Paragraph '6).
d. At the time of the execution of the second
contract, Respondent John A. Jensen acted greatly
insulted that his word should be questioned (Paragraph 9). Furthermore, appellants were assured
by respondents' attorney that "John in an honest
man . . . (and) . . . would keep the stock up
I've known him for years." (Paragraph 16).
Considering these facts in comparison with the
Beaver Drug case (Supra P. 29) this case appears much
stronger. In that case the defrauded party lacked
access for about the same reason as here. But the
actice steps to eonceal and d1:ssuade were lacking there~.

32

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

In the Adamson case (Supra P. 29) active steps to
conceal were taken (as in the Bennett case, Supra
P.), but if Adamson had consulted an attorney, he
would have been warned of the possibility of the loss
of his easement.
It n1ay be claimed that appellants are resorting to
parol evidence to support their position. .As stated in
Daly vs. Old et al., 99 P. 460 (At Page 463):
''If the intention of the parties cannot readily
be ascertained from the language alone, then the
court must have recourse to the situation, conditions, and circumstances which affected the parties, and from the languag.e when considered in
the light that those matters afford determine the
real intention of the parties."
To determine the ''Stock and fixtures now on the
property" as mentioned in the Earnest Money Agreement, obviously parol proof would be necessary.
The second contract refers to ''all improvements,
fixtures, equipment, signs, merchandise and stock now
on the premises ; see attached itemized list.'' This list
does not purport to include any restaurant ''stock''
and so is patently not complete. Again reference to
parol evidence is necessary to determine the full facts
and intention of the parties.
However, the main rule to consider in relation to
this problem is that the parol evidence rule may not
be invoked to uphold fraudulently induced provisions
in a con tract.
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In 24 Am. Jur. (Fraud and Deceit), Section 267),
P-ages 103-104 and 105 are found the following statements (with cases cited) :
"The fact that a contract is in writing does
not preclude the introduction of ·evidence to show
that a material stipulation therein was founded
on the misrepresentations and fraud of one of
the parties, or inserted by fraud, or that a material stipulation was omitted on account of
fraud .. .
" ... The reduction of an agreement to writing is not at all conclusive against fraud in the
contract, and the admission of extrinsic evidence
which bears clearly upon the existence of fraud
sought to be ·established for the purpose of avoid-.
ing the effect of the written agreement-as by
rescission, r~formation, or the establishment of a
trust-or as the basis of a tort action, does not
constitute an attempt to vary the terms of the
agreement by parol. It was never intended that
the parol evidence rule he used as a shield to
prevent the proof of fraud, or that a person
could arrang·e to have an agreement obtained by
him through fraud exercised upon the other contracting party reduced to writing and formally
executed, and thereby deprive the courts of the
power to prev·ent him from reaping the benefits
of his chicanery.
. . .The general rule that parol or extrinsic
evidence is admissible to prove that a written
contract was procured by fraud applies . . .
whether the evidence offered relates to fraud in
the ommission of a material provision or to fraud
in the insertion of, or a misrepresentation concerning, a certain term in the instrument, or
whether the evidence offered directly contradicts the writing or merely covers a point not
34
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referred to in the writing, and in sp~ite of special
provisions in the contract which purport to limit
the application of parol evidence by stating that
the writing contains all the terms involved and the
representations made, or that the written contract shall be the sole evidence of th·e transaction,
or that each contracting party relies and acts upon only his knowledge and not upon the representations of his adversary.'
So in Strike vs. White et al., 63 P. 2d 600, where
this court held that the parol evidence rule precluded
the introduction of certain oral testimony in an action
upon a contract, the court said: (At Page 602)

''If the contract does not express the intention of the parties, it may by proper p~roceedings
be reformed."

II.
Appellants' second count states a cause of action
In deceit against respondents.
The Utah cases do not seem to draw a distinction
between the elements of actionable fraud necessary
in deceit cases and those necessary in reformation and
recission cases. Therefore, the discussion under the
first point covers this point.
The Beaver Drug Company case (Supra P. 29)
seems entirely analagous to this case on the deceit
question and seems ample authority on the point.

III.
Appellants' third count states a cause of a.ction
for breach of warranty against respondents.
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Our Statute (81-1-12, U.C.A. 1943) ·defines an express 'varranty. We quote:
''Any affirmation of fact or any promise by
the seller r·ela ting to the goods is an express
warranty, if the natural tendency of such affirmation or promise is to induce the buyer to purchase the goods, and if the buyer purchases the
goods relying ther·eon. No affirmation of the
value of the goods, nor any statement purporting
to be a statement of the seller's opinion only,
shall be considered as a warranty.''
This has been amplified by the case of Nielson vs.
Hermansen, 166 P. 2d, 536. We quote from page 537:
'' . . . . an affirmation of fact that is a representation, is a warranty and not merely evidence of a warranty, if its natural tendency is to
induce the buyer to purchase the goods and the
buyer thus induced does purchase them. Words
of warranty such as ''I guarantee or I warrant''
are not neeessary for en express warranty; a
positive affirmation of the fact is enough to render the seller liable. The representation of fact
which would naturally tend to and does induce
a bargain is a warranty. The fact that the defendant did not intend to warrant is no defense if
he did make a statement which brings him within
the statute."
In 46 Am. J ur. ( S·ales), Section 324, Page 505,
Affirmations as to Quantity are dealt with as follows:
"Ordinarily. it would seem that a statement
by the seller as to the weight or quantity of specific commodities sold is to be regarded as a
36
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statement or expression of opinion rather than
an assertion of fact, and is not to be deemed a
warranty, and this is especially true when the
statement is qualified by the word 'about' or the
like. If, however, the circumstances show that it is
the intention ·of the parties that a. statement of
this c.haracter is a statement of a fact on whic.h
the buyer should rely, it is treated a.s a warranty,
and where goods shipped to the buyer are invoiced
as ·.containing a certain quantity, this is to be treated as a. warranty.''
Respondents argued before the District Judge that
the parol evidence rule bars evidence to show the statement and shortage, relying upon the provisions in the
second contract "See attached list". However, this
list did not purport to include items of restaurant
''stock'' and ''merchandise'', and so resort may be
had to parol evidence to explain what items constituted
said ''stock'' and ., 'merchandise' '. (See 46 Am. J ur.
(Sales) Section 316, Page 499, and discussion Supra
P. 33).
By the same token, the disclaimer provision of
the second contract that "there are no representations,
covenants or agreements between the parties hereto
with reference to said property except as herein specifically set forth or attached hereto'' does not bar
recovery upon this warranty, because the. written contract has left the quantity of stock uncertain and resort
must be had to the oral statement as to quantity to
complete the agreement.
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CONCLUSION
We respectfully submit that the District Court
erred in sustaining respondents·' demurrer. We submit
that a cause of action was stated alternately in either
the count for reformation, the count on deceit or the
count on breach of warranty.
Respectfully submitted,

GLEN M. HATCH and
B. Z. KASTLER, JR.
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
and Appellants.
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